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Smoak: Civil Procedure
CIVIL PROCEDURE

LIMITATIONS ON THE TOLLING STATUTE: A
TEMPORARY SOLUTION FOR A MORE PERMANENT
PROBLEM IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

You are the attorney for the defendant in an action where the plaintiff
is your client's ex-wife, and both are residents of the same state. Your client
leaves the state permanently, but the plaintiff knows your client's address and
could therefore locate him for purposes of serving process. The plaintiff waits
to file her claim until after the limitations period runs, but she is still permitted
to file because the limitations period was tolled by state law during your
client's absence from the state. In fact, the plaintiff could have waited for an
indefinite period of time before filing, all the while knowing how to locate your
client. Until recently, this was the interpretation given to South Carolina's
tolling statute under these circumstances.'
South Carolina currently has a statute that tolls the limitations period
for commencement of an action against a defendant who is absent from the
state for one year or more.2 Statutes of this kind are common and rational. They
prevent a limitations p erio d from running against a party who is unable to bring
a particular defendant under the court's jurisdiction.3 When state court
jurisdiction was more limited, tolling statutes served a very useful purpose.
However, recent extensions of state court jurisdictions have made tolling
statutes less necessary.
A majority of jurisdictions have amended, or at least judicially
construed, their tolling statutes to prevent their application when out-of-state
defendants 4 are amenable to personal service of process and can be brought
within the personal jurisdiction of the court.5 Until recently, South Carolina
remained in the minority of states that applied their tolling statutes to out-of-

1. See Meyer v. Paschal, 330 S.C. 175, 184,498 S.E.2d 635, 639 (1998) (finding the
tolling statute inapplicable under these facts).
2. S.C. CODE AN. § 15-3-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
3. See Burrows v. French, 34 S.C. 165, 168, 13 S.E. 355, 356 (1891).
4. For clarity the terms "absent defendants" and "out-of-state defendants" are used
interchangeably. The phrase "absent defendants" refers to residents that simply leave the state
for a period of time, while "out-of-state defendants" refers to persons that reside outside of the
state. However, the distinction serves no purpose for this discussion because it appears that
section 15-3-30 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina applies to both groups of defendants. Id.
at 168, 13 S.E. at 356.
5. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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state defendants even though these defendants were amenable to service of
process.6
In Meyer v. Paschafl the South Carolina Supreme Court brought the
state into the majority ofjurisdictions that prevent a tolling statute's application
when out-of-state defendants are amenable to service and can be brought within
the state's personal jurisdiction. While the holding may logically follow the
progression of personal jurisdiction and also make good common sense, a few
problems remain. For example, the holding is limited to "situations similar to
[Meyer] in which the name and location of the defendant is known to the
plaintiff."9 Additionally, "[w]hether the plaintiff had such knowledge could
conceivably be a question of fact."'0 These questions would seem to invite
more litigation to determine whether a plaintiff did, in fact, possess such
knowledge. Also in question are situations where a plaintiff could have or
should have known the information. The decision provides no guidance for
determining when a plaintiff could have or should have accessed the
defendant's name and location. These and other problems could potentially be
solved by the adoption of the federal rule governing time
for commencement
2
of actions." Other state rules offer alternatives as well.
Part II of this Note reviews Meyer and discusses the current state of
South Carolina jurisprudence regarding tolling the statute of limitations for
actions against out-of-state defendants. Part III reviews the history of the South
Carolina tolling statute, helping place the Meyer decision in its proper context.
Part IV discusses the ramifications of the Meyer holding and some potential
problems it may elicit. Finally, Part V offers alternatives to the system currently
in effect for serving process on and obtaining jurisdiction over absent
defendants.
II.

MEYER V. PASCHAL

In Meyer the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
order dismissing the plaintiff s claim as time barred. 3 The plaintiff, Meyer, and
the defendant, Paschal, were divorced after a twenty-three-year marriage. 4
Under the terms of a separation agreement, Paschal purchased a home in South
Carolina in 1982 for Meyer to occupy as her residence. 5 Paschal deeded the

6. See, e.g., Cutino v. Ramsey, 285 S.C. 74,76-77,328 S.E.2d 72,73 (1985); Harris
v. Dunlap, 285 S.C. 226, 228, 328 S.E.2d 908, 909 (1985).
7. 330 S.C. 175, 498 S.E.2d 635 (1998).
8. See infra Part IV.
9. Meyer, 330 S.C. at 184,498 S.E.2d. at 639.
10. Id.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see infra Part V.
12. See infra Part V.
13. 330 S.C. at 176, 498 S.E.2d at 635.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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property, which was titled in Paschal's name, to his sister in 1985.6 Meyer
knew of this transaction in 1986, the alleged time of the accrual of any cause
of action. 7 From the time of this transfer until Meyer commenced the suit,
Meyer knew of Paschal's and his sister's whereabouts, and Meyer continued
to occupy the house with no apparent change in conditions."8
Divorce proceedings in New Jersey led to a 1991 order, issued by the
New Jersey Superior court, directing Paschal to convey the house and lot to
Meyer.' 9 However, Paschal's sister, the new owner of the property, was not
made a party to the New Jersey divorce proceedings." Meyer brought suit in
South Carolina in 1994 attempting to domesticate the New Jersey order.2' Part
of the suit involved a fraudulent conveyance claim against Paschal and his
sister under sections 27-23-10 and 27-23-20e of the Code of Laws of South
Carolina.' The trial court dismissed this claim with prejudice24 because the sixyear statute oflimitations for this cause of action had expired.' Meyer admitted
over six years had passed since she had notice of the conveyance, but she
argued that section 15-3-30 operated to toll the statute of limitations when both
defendants were non-residents. 26 Section 15-3-30 provides:
If when a cause of action shall accrue
against any person he shall be out of the
State, such action may be commenced
within the terms in this chapter respectively
limited after the return of such person into
this State. And if, after such cause of action
shall have accrued, such person shall depart
from and reside out of this State or remain
continuously absent therefrom for the space
of one year or more, the time of his absence
shall not be deemed or taken as any part of
the time limited for the commencement of
such action. 7

16. Id. at 176-77, 498 S.E.2d at 635-36.

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 177, 498 S.E.2d at 636.
Id.
Id.
Id.

21. Id.
22. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-10, -20 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
23. Meyer, 330 S.C. at 177,498 S.E.2d at 636.

24. Id.
25. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(7) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (providing six-year
limitations period for fraud claims). Claims accruing after April 5, 1988 are subject to a new
three-year limitations period. Id. (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
26. See Meyer, 330 S.C. at 177,498 S.E.2d at 636.
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-30.
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Meyer's argument depended upon the court's strict interpretation of the statute
and its plain meaning, a view that South Carolina courts have taken since the
statute's adoption. 28 Two cases decided in 1985 expressly ruled that the tolling
statute still applied to out-of-state defendants who were amenable to service of
process and who could be brought under the state's jurisdiction. 9
In Meyer the South Carolina Supreme Court analyzed the historical
purposes of the statute and its apparent conflict with its plain meaning. 3°
Finding that the statutory language referring to a defendant who is out-of-state
means "a defendant who is beyond the personal jurisdiction and process of the
court and not simply a defendant who is physically absent from the State,"'" the
court affirmed the lower court's decision barring the plaintiff s suit because the
limitations period had expired. The Meyer court cited other jurisdictions
subscribing to this majority view3 2 and noted that such a ruling harmonized the
purpose of the tolling statute with the purposes of the long-arm, substitute
service, and limitations period statutes.33
Whereas the court of appeals three months earlier declined to tread on
what it considered to be legislative ground," the supreme court definitively
held the tolling statute inapplicable when the non-resident defendant is
amenable to personal service of process and can be brought within the personal
jurisdiction of South Carolina courts.35 However, the court limited its holding
to "situations similar to the instant case in which the name and location of the
defendant [are] known to the plaintiff. '36 Because Meyer knew the name and
location of the defendants who were at all times amenable to service, the tolling
statute did not apply, and the suit was barred by the statute of limitations.
III.

BACKGROUND

A.

South Carolina

The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Meyer was a
surprising reversal of jurisprudence even in light of recent decisions
interpreting the tolling statute. For some time before the ruling, South Carolina

28. See generallyRobert H. Putnam, Jr., Note, Statutes ofLimitations TolledAgainst
Out-of-StateDefendantsRegardlessofAvailability ofOtherMethods ofService, 38 S.C. L. REV.
158 (1986) (discussing cases infra note 29 and other interpretations of tolling statute).
29. Cutino v. Ramsey, 285 S.C. 74,77,328 S.E.2d 72,73 (1985); Harris v. Dunlap,
285 S.C. 226, 228, 328 S.E.2d 908, 909 (1985).
30. 330 S.C. at 178-84, 498 S.E.2d at 637-39.
31. Id. at 182, 498 S.E.2d at 638-39.
32. Id. at 182-83, 498 S.E.2d at 639.
33. Id. at 183, 498 S.E.2d at 639.
34. Tiralango v. Balfry, 329 S.C. 228,231,495 S.E.2d 234,236 (Ct. App. 1997), cert.
granted,No. 2766, Shealy Adv. Sh. No. 31 at 2 (S.C. Sept. 19, 1998).
35. Meyer, 330 S.C. at 184,498 S.E.2d at 639.
36. Id.
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courts had carved out exceptions to the tolling statute's application,37 but the
holdings in Cutino v. Ramsey' s and Harrisv. Dunlap39 had remained largely
intact. For example, the court held in 1993 that section 15-3-30 did not operate
to toll the statute of repose for medical malpractice actions.' Other decisions
more directly limited the tolling statute's application. In Dandy v. American
LaundryMachinery,Inc.41 the South Carolina Supreme Court created another
narrow exception to the tolling statute. The plaintiff in Dandy attempted to
serve an out-of-state defendant corporation by mailing the summons and
complaint to the defendant's registered agent.42 The defendant received the
summons and complaint after the applicable statute oflimitations had expired,43
but Dandy argued that section 15-3-3 0 applied to toll the statute of limitations."
The court recognized that the main purpose of the tolling statute was to remedy
the problem of locating an out-of-state defendant before the expiration of the
limitations period.4' However, this problem does not exist when a corporation
has a registered agent in South Carolina, as was apparently the case inDandy.46
Therefore, the court ruled that section 15-3-30 did not apply to toll the statute
of limitations in an action against a foreign corporation with a registered agent
in the state.47
The federal courts have also rendered decisions limiting the tolling
statute's application. In CatawbaIndian Tribe v. South Carolina48 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on reasoning similar to the court's in Langley
v. Pierce49 in deciding the tolling statute was not effective in adverse possession
cases because of a separate statutory scheme authorizing service by
publication."0 Because the scheme provided for service upon the out-of-state
defendant, the problem of locating an out-of-state defendant was not present. 1
In Guyton v. JM Manufacturing,Inc. 2 the United States District

37. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
38. 285 S.C. 74,77,328 S.E.2d 72,73 (1985) (holding that the limitations period is
tolled even though an out-of-state defendant is amenable to substituted service of process).
39. 285 S.C. 226,228,328 S.E.2d 908, 909 (1985) (holding that the limitations period
is tolled even though the long-arm statute allows a plaintiff to obtain personal jurisdiction over
an out-of-state defendant).
40. Langley v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401,403, 438 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1993) (holding that
the statute provided its own limited tolling provision); see S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545(D) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1998).
41. 301 S.C. 24, 389 S.E.2d 866 (1990).
42. Id. at 26, 389 S.E.2d at 867.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 27, 389 S.E.2d at 868.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 978 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1992).
49. 313 S.C. 401,438 S.E.2d 242 (1993).
50. Catawba,978 F.2d at 1348-49.
51. Id.
52. 894 F. Supp. 252 (D.S.C. 1995).
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Court for the District of South Carolina went one step further, ruling that
section 15-3-30 was unconstitutional as an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce5 3 The court explained that, after the ruling in Dandy,54 a foreign
corporation must appoint a registered agent in South Carolina in order to
receive the protection of the statute of limitations. 55 Forcing a corporation to
appoint a registered agent and subject itself to the general jurisdiction of the
state, the court reasoned, violated the Commerce Clause by creating too heavy
a burden on the corporation.56
B.

OtherJurisdictions
1.

Majority Approach

Mostjurisdictions addressing the specific question of whether a tolling
statute applies even when anon-resident defendant remains amenable to service
of process have decided that the tolling statute does not operate to toll the
statute of limitations during the period of absence or nonresidence. 7 A number
of theories have been advanced to support the majority position.
Some courts have reasoned that tolling the statute of limitations when
a defendant is amenable to service of process would conflict with the purpose
of the long-arm statute, which is to expedite litigation even though a defendant
is not present in the state.58 Some have also emphasized that tolling the statute
of limitations under these circumstances defeats the purpose of the statute of

limitations itself by allowing a plaintiff to postpone commencing an action

53. Id. at 254-55; see also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S.
888, 891 (1988) (striking down an Ohio tolling statute almost identical to South Carolina's
tolling statute because the burden imposed on interstate commerce by the statute exceeded any
local interest advanced by it).
54. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
55. Guyton, 894 F. Supp. at 254.
56. Id.
57. See generallyKenneth J. Rampino, Annotation, Tolling of Statute ofLimitations
During Absence from State as Affected by Fact That Party Claiming Benefit of Limitations
Remained Subject to Service DuringAbsence Or Nonresidence, 55 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1974 &
Supp. 1998) (analyzing various state tolling provisions and the interpretations given to them
when absent defendants remained subject to service); 51 AM. Jua. 2D Limitation of Actions
§§ 154-69 (1970 & Supp. 1998) (considering tolling statutes and the effects of a defendant's
nonresidence or absence from the jurisdiction).
58. See, e.g., Summerrise v. Stephens, 454 P.2d 224, 227 (Wash. 1969) ("[I]he tolling
provision in such cases is no longer necessary, and the statute of limitations should again be
permitted to perform its purpose of expediting litigation."); Bergman v. Turpin, 145 S.E.2d 135,
138 (Va. 1965) ("[T]he primary purpose of the nonresident motorist act is to afford a speedy
adjudication ofthe rights of the parties."); Law's Adm'r v. Culver, 155 A.2d 855, 858 (Vt. 1959)
("[T]o hold the contrary would conflict with the primary purpose of [the long-arm statute],
namely the speedy adjudication of the respective rights of the parties in cases to which it
applies.").
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when the claim could otherwise be advanced.5 9 Permitting plaintiffs to
postpone does not further the intended purpose of preventing claims from
growing stale. Other courts holding the majority view have emphasized the
injustice presented to defendants in these situations. Allowing plaintiffs to
postpone actions indefinitely prevents defendants from fully establishing all of
their available defenses.' Further, it may place some defendants and their
rights at a lower level of protection than other defendants and their rights. In
other words, out-of-state defendants amenable to service ofprocess would not
be protected by the statute of limitations, but in-state defendants would still
have this protection.
2.

Minority Approach

A limited number ofjurisdictions still hold the minority view that a
nonresident's amenability to service of process does not necessarily render the
tolling statute inapplicable.6' Courts adopting this view have chosen to give
tolling statutes a strict, literal interpretation, finding that tolling and long-arm
statutes are not mutually exclusive remedies, but are simply alternative methods
of service. 62 Often these courts are hesitant to perform what some perceive as
a legislative function.63 One court has stated that the legislature should be
responsible for curing any defects in a tolling statute.6

59. See, e.g., Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d 716,718 (Alaska 1971) ("To apply the tolling
statute to a situation where the defendant is at all times amenable to service is repugnant to the
general purposes of statutes of limitations.").
60. See, e.g., id. at 719 ("[A] defendant might not know until years had passed that
he was charged with liability for negligence."); Jarchow v. Eder, 433 P.2d 942,946 (Okla. 1967)
("To permit the plaintiff in a case such as this to defer the commencement of his cause of action
for an indefinite period of time, when there is continuously open to him the right to commence
a personal action against the defendant, would frequently result in hardship to the defendant,
who might often be completely unaware of his position of peril.").
61. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Deitz, 430 S.W.2d 487,489 (Tex. 1968) (holding that the
tolling statute is still valid despite the availability of substituted service statute).
62. See, e.g., Couts v. Rose, 90 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ohio 1950) ("[The long-arm statute
gives a plaintiff] an option to proceed at once against the allegedly culpable person remaining
out of the state, or to defer such procedure until he returns to the state, when the statute will
again begin to run by virtue of the provisions of [the tolling statute].").
63. See, e.g., Tiralango v. Balfry, 329 S.C. 228, 231,495 S.E.2d 234, 236 (Ct. App.
1997) ("However compelling Respondent's argument may be, we refuse to tread on legislative
ground."), cert. granted,No. 2766. Shealy Adv. Sh. No. 31 at 2 (S.C. Sept. 19, 1998); Bode v.
Flynn, 252 N.W. 284, 286 (Wis. 1934) ("The Legislature could, had it seen fit, have amended
the statute... so as to cover persons and all other corporations when a person representing them
resided in the state upon whom service might be procured, but it has never done so.").
64. Duke Univ. v. Chestnut,221 S.E.2d 895, 898 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976); see Reginald
Combs, Note, Tolled Statute ofLimitations v. Long-Arm StatuteAmenability, 12 WAKE FoREST
L. REv. 1041 (1976). The North Carolina Legislature responded to the court's suggestion by
amending its tolling statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (1996) ("The provisions of this section shall

not apply to the extent that a court of this state has or continues to have jurisdiction over the
person ....
).
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ANALYSIS

The court inMeyer expressly limited its holding to situations where the
"name and location of the defendant [are] known to the plaintiff."65 The court
went on to explain that "[w]hether the plaintiff had such knowledge could
conceivably be a question of fact."' With this language, the ruling elicits a few
interesting problems. First, the holding may spawn more litigation in a society
and legal system already overburdened and frustrated. Because the plaintiff s
knowledge may be a question of fact, every defendant will argue that he was
available to be served, so attorneys must prepare to argue an additional factual
issue before the court to determine whether the plaintiff possessed such
knowledge. Also, by making the plaintiff's knowledge relevant, this knowledge
must be inferred from other actions, which will require more discovery devoted
to this issue.
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina has
already encountered the problems arising from situations where the plaintiff
does not know the defendant's name and address, but could or should know
this information. 7 Recognizing that Meyer failed to address this question, the
district court interpreted the decision to include situations where "the name and
location of the defendant [are] not known to [the] plaintiff and is not able to be
discovered by reasonable methods before the statute of limitations runs."6
An additional, related problem is that if a plaintiff does not receive the
tolling statute's protection after the plaintiff discovers the defendant's name and
location, some of the incentive to locate an out-of-state defendant may be lost
on those plaintiffs who would take advantage of a tolling statute by postponing
claims forno goodpurpose. Although inmost situations the plaintiffwould want
to locate a defendant as soon as possible, occasionally a plaintiff could benefit
from allowing a claim to become stale. If the purpose of the long-arm statute,
substitute service statute, and statute of limitations is to adjudicate claims
expeditiously, and if this purpose is to be harmonized with the tolling statute's
purposes,69 permitting the tolling of the statute of limitations when a defendant's
name and address are unknown may in some situations defeat the statute's
purposes by removing the plaintiff's incentive to locate defendants.
V.

ALTERNATIVES

The problems Meyer presents may be indicative of the greater trouble
in South Carolina's methods for commencing an action and for service of

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Meyer v. Paschal, 330 S.C. 175, 184,498 S.E.2d 635, 639 (1998).
Id.
See Alday v. Teephy Div. Firminy, 10 F. Supp. 2d 562 (D.S.C. 1998).
Id. at 565.
See Meyer, 330 S.C. at 183, 498 S.E.2d at 639.
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process.7" A few changes to the procedural rules could potentially eliminate
altogether the need for a separate tolling statute. Other jurisdictions may offer
insight.
Under the federal rules, the filing of the complaint tolls the statute of
limitations." Aplaintiffthenhas 120 days to effect service upon the defendant.72
If the plaintiff fails to accomplish this service, the court "shall dismiss the action
without prejudice... provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the
failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period."'73
Therefore, a plaintiff must be persistent in attempting to effect service. If a
plaintiff is unable to effect service and has been diligent in his efforts to do so,
he may move to enlarge time,74 and "[a] court would undoubtably permit such
a plaintiff additional time within which to effect service. 7 5 This rule is
consistent with the purposes of the statute of limitations because it encourages
plaintiffs to pursue their claims diligently and, in fact, punishes them if they do
not. However, at the same time it allows for an extension of time in those
situations where a plaintiff has been unable to locate a defendant, but has made
every effort to do so. Those who may be concerned about the burden placed
upon plaintiffs by such a rule could be appeased by an alteration in the wording
of the rule to read "the court... may dismiss" instead of "shalldismiss" to allow
discretion.76
Adoption of the federal rule would also eliminate a procedure in South
Carolina that has proven to be problematic. South Carolina Rule of Civil
Procedure 3(b) provides for the tolling of a limitations period by delivering the
summons and complaint to the sheriff of the county in which the defendant
usually resides or last resided.77 Courts have been forced to deal with questions
such as whether a private investigator is analogous to a sheriff for purposes of
tolling78 and whether service to a sheriff on the weekend extends the statute of
limitations to the next work day.79 The federal approach is a more simple
procedure and is one that forces a plaintiff to make either a diligent effort to

70. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 3(a) and 4.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 3. But see S.C. R. Civ. P. 3(a) ("A civil action is commenced by
filing and service of a summons and complaint.").
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
73. Id.
74. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 4 legislative statement.
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
77. S.C. R. Civ. P. 3(b). Rule 3(b) replaced an earlier statute. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976), repealed by 1985 Act No. 100, § 2 (effective July 1, 1995)
(providing for delivery "to the sheriff or other officer") (emphasis added).
78. See Able v. Schweitzer, 300 S.C. 321,323, 387 S.E.2d 697, 698 (Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that delivery of summons and complaint to a private investigator does not toll the
statute of limitations).
79. See Creech v. N.T.D. Indus., Inc., 815 F. Supp. 165, 171 (D.S.C. 1993) (holding
that delivery of process to the sheriff on Saturday or Sunday extends the statute of limitations
to the next work day).
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serve an absent defendant or show the court good cause for failure to do so. The
limitations period would automatically toll upon filing the complaint, thus
eliminating both the need for serving the sheriff and the difficulties associated
with the procedure.
Although actual service is the preferred method of service, publication
is an option when a defendant cannot be found after a diligent search. South
Carolina's statute allows service by publication in a limited number of
situations,"0 but a more liberal publication rule, such as the one used in North
Carolina,"1 would allow plaintiffs to serve defendants more effectively, lessening
the need for a tolling provision. North Carolina allows an out-of-state party who
cannot be served personally after due diligence to be served by publication "in

80. SeeS.C.CODEANN. § 15-9-710(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998). Section 15-9-710(a)
allows for service by publication under the following circumstances:
(1) when the defendant is a foreign
corporation and has property within the State or the
cause of action arose therein;
(2) when the defendant, being a resident of
this State, has departed therefrom, with intent to
defraud his creditors or to avoid the service of a
summons or keeps himself concealed therein with
like intent;
(3) when the defendant is a resident of this
State and after a diligent search cannot be found;
(4) when the defendant is not a resident of
this State but has property therein and the court has
jurisdiction of the subject of the action;
(5) when the subject of the action is real or
personal property in this State and the defendant has
or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent,
therein or the relief demanded consists wholly or
partly in excluding the defendant from any interest or
lien therein;
(6) when the defendant is a party to an
adoption proceeding and is either a nonresident or a
person upon whom service cannot be had within the
State after due diligence;
(7) when the defendant is a party to a
proceeding for the determination of parental rights
and is either a nonresident or a person upon whom
service cannot be had within the State after due
diligence; and
(8) when the defendant is a party to an
annulment proceeding or where the subject of the
matter involves the custody of minor children,
support of minor children or wife, separate
maintenance, or a legal separation.
Id.; see also id.§ 15-9-720 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (service by publication in certain cases affecting
real estate in South Carolina).
81. SeeN.C.R.CIv.P.4(jl).
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a newspaper circulated in the county where the action is pending." 2 This can be

done only when there is no reliable information regarding the location of the
party to be served,83 precisely the situation where a tolling statute would
otherwise be useful." The Meyer holding still permits tolling in South Carolina
when the name and location of the defendant is unknown to the plaintiff.8 5 The
holding may also be limited to amenability to personal service of process,
implying that service by publication would be inadequate to escape the tolling
statute's application.
VI.

CONCLUSION

By deciding the state's tolling statute does not apply when defendants
are amenable to service of process and plaintiffs know the name and location of
defendants, the South Carolina Supreme Court has found a temporary solution
to a permanent problem. Limiting the tolling statute helps prevent inequity in
certain situations, but doing so exposes other potential problems. Solving this
dilemma ultimately should be a legislative function. Until then, the judiciary
must rely on the Meyer decision and the potential difficulties that may
accompany it. The South Carolina General Assembly should seriously consider
adopting parts of the federal rule or rules from other states regarding service of
process and commencing actions. Measuring the time for commencing an action
from the date of filing would be a first step in the right direction. If the federal
approach is not adopted, the General Assembly should at least consider a
publication rule similar to North Carolina's for serving process on out-of-state
defendants. Adoption of these rules would virtually eliminate the need for a
tolling statute and the controversies that accompany it.
Stephen R. Smoak

82. Id. Butsee Montgomery v. Mullins, 325 S.C. 500, 505,480 S.E.2d 467,470 (Ct.
App. 1997) ("Service of process by publication is authorized by S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-710(3)
(Supp. 1995) where the defendant is a resident of this state, but after a diligent search cannot be
found in this state.").
83. N.C.R. Ctv. P. 4 (l).
84. See, e.g., Tiemey v. Garrard, 477 S.E.2d 73,76 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (rulingthat
exemption from tolling provision for a defendant amenable to service of process was not limited
topersonalservice so that plaintiff could not use tolling provision even if defendant's location
was unknownbecause service bypublication was available); seeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (1996).
85. Meyer v. Paschal, 330 S.C. 175, 184, 498 S.E.2d 635, 639 (1998).
86. See id.
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